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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a control system 
which is widely used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and control 
industrial processes autonomously. Most of the SCADA communication protocols 
are vulnerable to various types of cyber-related attacks. The currently used security 
standards for SCADA communication specify the use of asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithms like RSA or ECC for securing SCADA communications. There are 
certain performance issues with cryptographic solutions of these specifications when 
applied to SCADA system with real-time constraints and hardware limitations. To 
overcome this issue, in this thesis we propose the use of a faster and light-weighted 
NTRU cryptographic algorithm for authentication and data integrity in securing 
SCADA communication. Experimental research conducted on ARMv6 based 
Raspberry Pi and Intel Core machine shows that cryptographic operations of NTRU 
is two to thirty five times faster than the corresponding RSA or ECC. Usage of 
NTRU algorithm reduces computation and memory overhead significantly making it 
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Critical Infrastructure represents the basic facilities, services and installations 
necessary for functioning of a community, such as water, power lines, 
transportation, communication systems, and so on. Any act or practice that causes a 
real-time Critical Infrastructure System to impair its normal function and 
performance will have debilitating impact on security and economy, with direct 
implication on the society. Critical infrastructure system operation involves the 
exchange of real-time data from various distributed control systems along the local 
and wide area communication networks to support a variety of vital mechanisms. To 
enable such mechanisms messages have to be delivered in a secure and timely 
manner using a cost-efficient and compatible communication protocol.   
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system [19] is a control 
system which is predominantly used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and 
control industrial processes autonomously. SCADA can be seen as a combination of 
hardware, software, controllers, networks and computers that assist in the remote 
monitoring and co-ordination of control systems of an adverse infrastructure like 
smart grids, chemical plants, transportation systems etc. These systems have been in 
use from 1960’s. Ever since then SCADA has been gradually evolving along with 
new upcoming technologies making it more flexible, yet more vulnerable. 
SCADA systems previously designed were connected to limited private network. 
There was no need of protecting such closed architecture against any cyber-attack. 




severity. The SCADA system used today is easily affected by cyber-attacks due to 
the arrival of IP technologies and standards into the design of such systems. This 
integration supports new IT capabilities, but it provides significantly less isolation 
for SCADA systems from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a 
greater need to secure these systems. SCADA provides automation solutions using 
several standards such as the IEC-61850 [11], DNP3 [12], IEC 60870-5 [13] and 
Modbus [14]. Most of these protocols run over unsecure TCP/IP networks using 
high speed switched Ethernet to obtain necessary response times. It is therefore 
imperative that system security and risk mitigation be at the forefront of the minds 
of all SCADA system users.  
1.1 Need for Current Work 
Encryption and authentication are highly effective methods to reduce some of these 
cyber threats to SCADA communications. Recently, there have been several efforts 
to secure the SCADA systems. Security communities have been trying to make 
security policies, operational, quality and system recommendations to provide 
security systems for SCADA infrastructure. There are two open standards for 
SCADA communications available on the market today that were developed to 
provide security through encryption and authentication: IEC 62351suite [6 and 11] 
and IEEE6189 suite (also known as AGA-12 incorporated in IEEE 1711), these 
standards secure SCADA equipment communication [3]. However there have been 
few noted performance issues in meeting the timing requirements of utilities such as 
smart grid and water companies, while implementing IEC 62351 and AGA-12 




AGA-12 and IEC 62351 standards approve the use of asymmetric algorithms such 
as RSA [16] and ECC [17] for digital signing which is used for authentication 
purposes. Unfortunately in practical, some SCADA applications involving delay 
constraints limit their security to just authentication. They don’t adopt any 
encryption technique to secure the integrity of the message as the digital signing 
process using RSA is time consuming and process intensive [15]. Also there are 
number of insecure connections in the SCADA network unprotected with the 
absence of authentication and encryption [4] (due to the expensive asymmetric 
cryptographic operations), e.g. ports used for maintenance of SCADA system, 
examination of the SCADA system, obtaining remote access to the system etc. Such 
devices or applications and the communication channel it uses is highly susceptible 
to attacks and hence results in compromise of the integrity of data transmitted. 
Although ECC based authentication mechanisms can provide better performance 
results when compared to RSA, in practical it is necessary to consider algorithms 
faster than ECC for real-time applications. The objective of this thesis is to provide a 
better solution for SCADA device/channel authentication and data integrity by 
introducing the use of faster and light-weighted NTRU cryptographic, rather than 
the currently used slow RSA or comparatively slow ECC. 
Our experiments were performed on ARMv6 based Raspberry Pi and Intel 
machine running Windows 7 for evaluating the performance of different asymmetric 
cryptosystems. Our results show that usage of a light-weight asymmetric key 






 Chapter 2 gives a general background of the SCADA architecture, advantages of 
using internet-based SCADA systems and an overview of SCADA Communication 
protocols. Chapter 3 discusses the need for SCADA security and the common 
attacks it encounters.  Chapter 4 gives a brief introduction on the role of 
cryptography in SCADA security and practical difficulties involved in implementing 
them. Chapter 5 discusses about the NTRU cryptographic algorithm and the 
proposed approach of applying it to improve the security standards of SCADA 
system.  Chapter 6 subsequently describes about our experimentation on Raspberry 
Pi and Intel Core Machines to evaluate and compare the performance of NTRU with 
RSA & ECC cryptographic operations and discuss our findings.  Chapter 7 gives the 

















This chapter gives an overview of SCADA architecture, advantage of using Internet 
based SCADA system and overview of the SCADA communication protocols 
2.1 SCADA Architecture 
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, which is a 
computer-based control system that is used for collecting and analyzing real-time 
data. SCADA systems are designed to collect field information, transfer it to a 
central computer facility, and display the information to the operator graphically or 
textually, thereby allowing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from 
a central location in real time. Based on the sophistication and setup of the 
individual system, control of any individual system, operation, or task can be 
automatic, or it can be performed by operator commands. 
The basic SCADA architecture consists of following fundamental components:  
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
RTU’s are microprocessor based devices deployed in the field at specific sites and 
locations to support SCADA remote stations. They serve as local collection points 
gathering information for the control center, from field control devices remotely and 
issue commands to the field control system. Control devices are components like 
sensors, actuators, electric motors, console lights, switches, and valves etc. that are 
deployed in the field to perform and control local operation. Local operation can 
involve data collection from sensor systems, opening and closing of valves, turning 




      Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 
The PLC is a small industrial computer originally designed to perform the logic 
functions executed by electrical hardware (relays, drum switches, and mechanical 
timer/counters). PLCs have evolved into controllers with the capability of 
controlling complex processes, and they are used substantially in SCADA systems. 
They provide the same control as RTU except that RTUs are designed for specific 
control applications. 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) 
An IED is a “smart” sensor/actuator containing the intelligence required to acquire 
data, communicate to other devices, and perform local processing and control. An 
IED could combine an analog input sensor, analog output, low-level control 
capabilities, a communication system, and program memory in one device. The use 
of IEDs in SCADA systems allows for automatic control at the local level. 
Master Terminal Unit (MTU) 
The Master units (MTUs) serve as the central processor of the SCADA system.  
They monitor and control large number of RTUs/PLCs. They acquire information 
from RTU’s/PLC’s, carryout necessary analysis and control; provide the reading and 
equipment details to the human operators through HMI. In an internet-based 
SCADA network, the MTU’s can be on a different network or location.  
Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
HMI is a computer system that runs powerful graphics for displaying status and 
historical information to operators. Human operators use HMIs to configure set 




devices remotely by observing the readings and sending instructions to specific 
RTU’s.  
Communication Network 
One of the most important elements of the SCADA system is the communication 
network which acts as a bridge between the control systems. SCADA 
communication is conducted over leased lines/switched telephone, wide area 
network/internet, radio/microwave and satellite. 
 
            
Figure 2.1 Basic SCADA Architecture 
 
Figure 2.1 shows a basic SCADA architecture which is interconnected with the 
internet.  The traditional proprietary and closed SCADA architecture cannot meet 
the ever-changing requirements of Critical Infrastructure Industry. Internet based 
architecture is highly essential to provide an ideal and flexible platform for this 





2.1.1 Advantages of using Internet-based SCADA Architecture 
We come across many companies that have leveraged internet for their SCADA 
systems, either by building new applications from scratch or by enabling internet 
accessibility to the existing SCADA systems. The major reasons that motivates 
companies to adopt IP technologies into their SCADA design include, 
 It reduces the infrastructure cost, as they have the benefit of using public 
Internet instead of using the expensive dedicated lines.  
 It allows them to access information in an easier way from remote sites and 
assists in improving system efficiency and performance. 
 It provides immediate access to real-time data. 
 It reduces the cost involved in repairing and other labor costs required for 
troubleshooting or service when a dedicated line fails. 
 It facilitates compliance with regulatory agencies through automated report 
generating from remote equipment.  
 It is more flexible in terms of choosing equipment and systems based on 
price/performance rather than compatibility with installed base. 
 It supports scalability quickly from few sites to thousands. 
2.2 SCADA Communication Standards and Trends 
The information/control signals exchanged between SCADA devices and other 
control systems through a network, or other media is governed by rules and 
conventions that can be set out in technical specifications called Communication 





2.2.1 SCADA Communication Protocols 
Protocol designs in SCADA are compact and are so designed as to send information 
to MTU only in case the RTU is polled for information by the MTU. Typical legacy 
SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, ASCII, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel. 
These communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific. Standard protocols 
are IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3 [13]. These communication 
protocols are standardized and recognized by all major SCADA vendors. 
Communication protocols with extensions can operate in internet protocol TCP/IP. 
For e.g. Modbus TCP/IP has now become standard for lot of hardware 
manufacturers and is widely accepted communication protocol. Although it is 
advisable not to connect it to internet and expose it to risk, Ethernet TCP/IP has 
found its way into industrial automation breaking the barriers in majority of SCADA 
market. 
The following protocols are emerging as virtual standards in modern SCADA 
systems. 
2.2.1.1 Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) 
DNP3 is a protocol that defines communications between master stations, remote 
terminal units (RTUs), and IEDs in SCADA. IEEE has opted DNP3 as a standard 
for Electric power system communications [12]. It is also widely used in water 
infrastructure, oil, gas, security and other industries. Initially, DNP3 was designed 
without any security features. DNP3 is extended to DNP3 Secure Authentication 
(SA) [26], which was designed to meet requirements of IEC 62351-5. DNP3-SA 




authentication codes (HMACs).Implementation presumes that both master station 
and outstation share a common secret key, called an update key, which is used to 
generate a session key. The recently released DNP3-SA5 reinforces overall security 
for data information gathering, exchange, and use in SCADA systems. 
Network Architecture: DNP3 was initially designed with four layers: physical, 
data link, transport and application layer. Originally physical layer involved serial 
communication protocols such as RS-232, RS-422 or RS-485. Today’s DNP3 has 
been ported over TCP/IP layer to support recent communication technologies, and 
thus can be considered as three-layer network protocol operating upon the TCP/IP 
layer[27] to support end-to-end communications. Figure 2.2 shows DNP3 protocol 
wrapped inside TCP/IP data packet. 
 
 





2.2.1.2 IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 was published as a standard by IEC (International Electrochemical 
Commission) for Substation Automation system. It was created to be an 
internationally standardized method of communication and integration to support 
systems built from IEDs and RTUs independent of the device manufacturer. It also 
defines certain performance classes for different communication methods. Table 2.1 
shows a list of delay requirements for IEC 61850 messages, which reveals that 
power substation communication contains a number of time-critical messages with 
application layer delay constraints varying from 3ms to 500ms. 
 
Message Type Delay Constraints(ms) 
Type 1A/P1 3 
Type 1A/P2 10 
Type 1B/P1 100 
Type 1B/P2 20 
Type 2 100 
Type 3 500 
 
Table 2.1 Timing Requirements for messages in power substations 
 
Network Architecture: Differing from DNP3 that is based on TCP/IP, IEC 61850 
specifies a series of protocol stacks for variety of services including TCP/IP, 




Any security standard that attempts to secure IEC 61850 based traffic must take 
into consideration of these performance requirements. 
2.2.1.3 IEC 60870-5 
IEC 60870-5 provides a communication profile for sending basic tele-control 
messages between two systems, which uses permanent directly connected data 
circuits between the systems. It is one of the widely accepted standards in Electric 
power systems that enable interoperability among compatible tele-control 
equipment. 
2.3 Overview of IEC 62351 
For some years now, Critical infrastructure systems using SCADA architecture have 
been attempting to secure the different protocols it uses. This push for security is 
mainly due to the movement from “point to point” communication between devices 
to large TCP/IP networks. This resulted in the emergence of IEC 62351 series. Its 
primary objective was to undertake the development of standards for security of the 
communication protocols defined by IEC TC 57, specifically IEC 61850, IEC 
60870-5 series and its derivatives (i.e., DNP3).However, the current scope of IEC 
62351 is aimed at defining numerous mechanisms to protect exchange of 
information in automation applications [6]. The major goal of this standardization is 
to provide end-to-end security in power automation systems. Table 2.2 IEC 62351 
specification covering different OSI layers. Some IEC 62351-3 standards are as 
follows: 
• IEC 62351-3 identifies how to ensure secure TCP/IP-based protocols using 




• IEC 62351-5 defines security for IEC 60870-5 and its derivatives, providing 
different solutions for serial and networked versions. It uses TLS for TCP/IP 
profiles and encryption for serial profiles. It specifies how to incorporate user 
and device authentication, and data integrity. Existing protocols like DNP3 has 
been extended to meet the authentication requirements of IEC 62351-5. 




1 2 3 4 5-7 
3 Profiles Including TCP    X  
4 Profiles Including MMS     X 
5 Security for IEC 60870-5 and Derivatives  X X X X 
6 Security for IEC 61850 Profiles  X X  X 
9 Cyber security key management for power 
system equipment 
 X X X X 
11 Security for XML Files(Pending)     X 
 
Table 2.2 IEC 62351 covering different layers of OSI model 
 
Besides power systems, other SCADA systems, and other critical infrastructure 
systems can deploy the specified security measures in IEC 62351 because they have 









SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCADA COMMUNICATION 
This chapter focuses on the need for securing SCADA communication and common 
threats associated with SCADA network. 
3.1 Need for securing SCADA Communication 
Traditional SCADA systems were designed to be closed networks; they were 
separated from other enterprise or public networks. They also used proprietary 
hardware, software and network protocols which increased the difficulty of 
understanding SCADA systems. So security was not considered as a big issue. 
However due to advent of internet-based communication, today more 
organizations connect SCADA networks with other potentially unsecure networks to 
leverage the benefits listed before. Although it looks beneficial, several attacks have 
been reported in this modern internet-based SCADA system. According to the latest 
ICS-CERT (Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response team) report in 
the first-half of fiscal year 2013, over 200 attempted intrusions were detected. From 
Figure 3.1 highest percentage of incidents were reported in the energy sector at 53%. 
Due to the internet, technical information needed to attack these systems is widely 
discussed making the SCADA system even more vulnerable. Critical security flaws 
have become well known to potential hackers. It is feared that SCADA systems can 








Figure 3.1 Percentage of incidents reported across all Critical Infrastructure 
sectors (Oct, 2012 – May, 2013) 
 
3.1.1 Risk Factors associated with SCADA Architecture 
During the analysis for providing a secure SCADA communication, few factors 
were reported to have contributed to the escalation of risk to SCADA system. Those 
include: 
 Usage of standardized technologies whose vulnerabilities are well known to 
attackers. For e.g. nine out of ten SCADA systems use Windows, others use 
Unix-like operating system. Attackers are knowledgeable in these 
technologies, so it becomes easier for them to wage attacks on these systems. 
 Insecure connections: The communication link that most SCADA enterprise 
uses (e.g. leased line, internet, wide area network etc.) to transmit data 
between control systems and remote locations, could be easily compromised.  
 Readily available technical information about control systems: Internet is 
flooded with information on infrastructures and control systems. Hackers and 
attackers use this information to understand about the system and find ways 




 Sometimes control systems which are installed incorrectly might also act as a 
threat as they can bridge networks together unintentionally. 
 In par with an external threat, there is also the risk of internal threat where an 




Figure 3.2 Points of vulnerability in a SCADA network- Example 
 
As a consequence of all these issues and as attackers are becoming more 
sophisticated in performing cyber-related criminal and terrorist activities, there is an 




communication. Figure 3.2 shows a security compromised SCADA network and the 
potential points of vulnerability. 
3.2 Attacks in SCADA Communication - Classification 
Current SCADA devices are effective in detecting and preventing well-known 
Internet attacks, but until recently they have not addressed SCADA communication 
protocol attacks completely. SCADA vendors are beginning to develop and 
incorporate attack signatures [18] for various SCADA protocols such as Modbus, 
IEC-61850, and DNP3. Attacks that possibly affect the SCADA communication are 
listed below: 
Data Integrity Attacks 
In SCADA system, attacks that result in modification or destruction of control and 
sensing signals/messages is referred to as Data Integrity attacks and any prolonged 
loss of data results in Denial of Service (DoS) attack. These attacks could cause the 
system to behave in an unstable manner by hijacking its normal operation.  
 Example – An attacker can make unauthorized changes to programmed 
instructions/status values in RTUs, resulting in damage to equipment, 
premature shutdown of processes, or even disabling control equipment. 
Authentication Attacks 
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of an entity. SCADA system is 
vulnerable to an unauthorised party who can send fake messages which may damage 
the industrial control process controlled by SCADA. Hence devices have to provide 
their identity details for communication. Whenever a SCADA device receives a 




Only when the receiving device is satisfied with the identity response, it acts upon 
the original command. 
 Example – An attacker can send false information to control system 
operators to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions 
by system operators. 
Confidentiality Attacks 
Confidentiality attacks in SCADA system are caused by gaining access to sensitive 
data, either by eavesdropping on the network (non-secure communication line) or 
accessing the repository. Disclosure of sensitive data results in loss or damage to the 
entire SCADA system. To protect sensitive data from unauthorized users, data is 
encrypted before it is transmitted through an unprotected communication channel 
like a public network. Encrypted data becomes meaningless or unintelligible to an 
eavesdropper. Only the intended recipient can decrypt the message with the secret 
key. 
 Example 1 – An attacker can over hear a communication between control 
systems and can en-route a data exchange by assuming exchanger’s identity.  
 Example 2 – They can eavesdrop and acquire desired information, such as 
customer’s private details. 
Non-repudiation Attacks 
Non-repudiation is a service that provides proof of integrity and origin of data 
thereby assuring an authentication to be genuine. Origin of data is more important in 




 Example – An attacker can guess the private key corresponding to the 
signing certificate and change the message origin. 
The key requirement of a secure SCADA system is to provide solutions to defend 
these attacks. 
3.3 Attack simulated in Power System 
Many vendors use TCP/IP to transport SCADA messages. Link layer frames are 
embedded into TCP/IP packets for transmission. This approach has enabled SCADA 
architecture to take advantage of Internet technology and allow collecting data 
economically and controlling geographically separated devices. This has made the 
system more vulnerable to cyber-attacks.  
An attack was simulated with a DNP3 simulator to show how an attacker can 
modify the data (in this case, increase the current load above 400 amps) without 
control center/MTU being notified of the changes. Triangle MicroWorks Protocol 
Test Harness Tool was used to perform a data-integrity attack in an electric power 
system. 
3.3.1 Terminology in Power system 
Polling: Polling refers to actively sampling the status of an external device by a 
client program as a synchronous activity. 
Relay: A relay is an electrically operated switch. Many relays use an electromagnet 
to operate a switching mechanism mechanically, but other operating principles are 
also used. Relays with calibrated operating characteristics are used to protect 
electrical circuits from overload or faults: in modern electric power systems these 





 Figure 3.3 shows RTU simulator that displays the normal current flow with a 
closed circuit state. The load current is 200 Amps. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 RTU displaying normal current flow 
 
 MTU keeps monitoring the status of its RTUs and controls it. Figure 3.4 






                
     Figure 3.4 Status view from the MTU 
 
 To perform an attack, DNP3 polling was shut down (as seen in Figure 3.5) 
and the current load was increased to 400 Amps. As the polling was disabled, 
the master station will not receive any status message from the RTU.  
 
   




 This caused the relay to trip and stopped the current flow which can be seen 
in Figure 3.6. 
 
                    
       Figure 3.6 RTU showing zero current flow 
 
 However, there was no status change in the master view because polling was 
not enabled. The status was the same as seen in Figure 3.4. 
 If the polling had been enabled, the master view would have looked like the 






   
Figure 3.7 Master view if polling was not shutdown 
 
This simulation shows what could have happened if an attacker/hacker had turned 
off polling. Though it looks like a simple attack, its impact is huge. This has 
increased the need for securing a SCADA system. Securing SCADA communication 














CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS IN SCADA SECURITY 
This chapter provides an overview of cryptographic solutions in SCADA security 
and discusses on the practical difficulties while implementing those. 
4.1 Role of Cryptography in SCADA security 
For securing the overall SCADA communication completely the existing SCADA 
protocols must ensure to provide end-to-end authentication, data integrity, non-
repudiation and confidentiality [8]. Cryptography is a hidden component of all these 
security measures or cyber security policies. NIST [20], IEEE, AGA (American Gas 
Association) and many other organisations have been sincerely engaged in 
developing cryptographic standards to secure SCADA communication [2, 3, and 4].  
Cryptographic primitive approaches are needed in SCADA system to deal with 
attacks targeting integrity and confidentiality that cause negligible effect on the 
network performance. 
4.1.1 Terminology 
Encryption and Decryption 
Encryption and decryptions are cryptographic methods used to achieve secure 
communication and information. Encryption is the conversion of data into a form, 
called a cipher text, which cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people. 
Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original form, so 
it can be understood by the intended recipient. The design and choice of encryption 






A cryptosystem can be considered as a suite of three algorithms: for key generation, 
encryption and decryption. The two primary cryptosystems used are Symmetric and 




Symmetric Cryptosystem Asymmetric Cryptosystem 
Key Management Symmetric encryption uses only 
one key that all parties to the 
message exchange must know, so 
the key is the same on either side 
of the transmission. Complicates 
key management as it requires 
secure exchange and update of 
secret keys among the 
communication SCADA 
systems/devices. 
Asymmetric encryption uses a 
public and a private key. The 
owner holds the private key and 
never shares it with anyone. The 
public key is available to anyone 
to decrypt a message from the 
owner, and only the owner's 
private key can encrypt the 
message. 
Speed Faster due to simplicity of 
algorithm. 




Uses shorter key length generally. Requires longer key lengths to 
achieve a given level of security. 
Security Risk Risk is the disclosure of shared 
key to an unauthorized entity. 
Less risky since private key is not 
shared to anyone. 
Resource Utilization Requires approximately constant 
computational resources 
regardless of key size. 
Requires more computational 





Standard(AES),  Data Encryption 
Standard (DES), Triple DES 
RSA, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography(ECC) 




Table 4.1 shows a detailed comparison of the two cryptosystems. It is necessary to 
determine the appropriate choice of cryptosystem in SCADA communication to 
provide a secure end-to-end communication.  Both symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptographic solutions have their own advantages and disadvantages. Application 
of such solutions in SCADA communication may present design and operational 
challenges. So it is necessary to identify appropriate solution for specific SCADA 
control system. 
IEC 62351 is one of the recommended standards by NIST for securing the 
communication between control systems. It is widely adopted in substation 
automation system. Table 4.2 shows the different attacks in SCADA system with the 
cryptographic solutions proposed by IEC 62351 to handle them. 
 
Type of Attack Cryptographic Solutions by IEC 62351 
Data-Integrity Attack Symmetric (AES, DES, TDES) and 
Asymmetric Encryption algorithms (RSA, 
ECC), Hashing algorithms (SHA-1 , SHA-2, 
SHA-256) 
Authentication Attack HMAC, Asymmetric Digital Signature schemes 
Confidentiality Attack Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption 
algorithms, Asymmetric Digital Signature 
schemes 
Non-repudiation Asymmetric Digital Signature schemes 









4.2 Role of Asymmetric Cryptography in SCADA Communication Protocols 
Both symmetric and asymmetric based approaches become major counter measures 
against such attacks [7]. The following describes the need for asymmetric 
cryptography in SCADA communication on two major topics: 
4.2.1 In Encryption and Decryption 
Encryption & Decryption are elementary cryptographic methods to achieve secure 
communication and information protection from unauthorized users. In SCADA 
systems, most devices are expected to have at least basic cryptographic capabilities, 
including the support for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Although 
symmetric key encryption is faster and uses less computational resources than 
asymmetric counterpart, sharing a common secret key increases the risk for attacks. 
For SCADA system involving millions of devices, adopting symmetric counter 
measure leads to generation of several keys, one each for a communication with 
every different party. Key management becomes difficult and moreover authenticity 
of the message cannot be verified. Hence there is a need to use a faster and a light 
weight asymmetric encryption scheme in SCADA systems. 
4.2.2 In Authentication 
It is a system for certifying the origin of a communication or the process for 
verifying that an entity or object is who or what it claims to be. Authentication is a 
crucial identification process to eliminate attacks targeting data integrity. 
Authentication protocols used in SCADA system should be highly efficient, tolerant 




Authentication Code (HMAC) [21] and digital signature schemes are the common 
authentication mechanisms in SCADA.  
Multicast has wide applications in SCADA systems, including monitoring, 
protection, and information dissemination e.g. in substation communication systems 
[11]. The most straightforward multicast authentication scheme is to use asymmetric 
digital signatures, which is also recommended by a recent security standard for 
substation communication, IEC 62351.This is mainly because HMAC does not 
provide data-origin authentication in multicast traffic. In group traffic, all grouped 
members share the same single HMAC key (symmetric key) and hence the identity 
of the sender is not uniquely established. Although HMAC provides group-level 
security, data-origin authentication is not achieved. Since asymmetric digital 
signature uses 2 keys, one which is never shared, it can provide true data-origin 
authentication making it a valuable choice. 
4.3 Challenges in implementing Cryptographic solutions for SCADA security 
It is always necessary to understand the performance impacts for any Critical 
infrastructure using SCADA system before introducing any cryptographic solution 
for its security. The typical characteristics of SCADA network make it challenging 
to adapt cryptographic protocols such as asymmetric cryptosystems into SCADA 
systems with limited resources and SCADA systems involving real-time traffic. 
Existing cryptographic technologies for authorization, authentication, encryption and 
decryption require more bandwidth, processing power and memory than what the 




solution to SCADA systems poses significant challenges mainly due to following 
constraints. 
 Limited computational capacity: The remote equipment such as RTUs is 
an embedded system having low computational and space capacity. 
 Low rate data transmission: Since the SCADA system has been used for a 
long time, the communication line of the SCADA network has low 
bandwidth. 
 Real-time processing: The SCADA system should behave accurately. Delay 
of data processing could cause serious problem. 
The difficulty of applying security technology to the system makes the constraints to 
be a basic consideration for applying security mechanism. 
4.3.1 Performance Issues while implementing IEC 62351 
The scope of IEC 62351 lies in the development of standards for security of 
communication protocols defined by IEC TC57, IEC 60870-5& 6 series, IEC 61850 
series and IEC 61968 series for Substation Automation control systems. They try to 
provide the standards for authenticating and encrypting SCADA communication link 
in Power system. IEC 62351-3 to IEC 62351-6 provide various levels of protocol 
security, depending upon the protocol (e.g. MMS, GOOSE, SMV, DNP3 etc.). IEC 
62351 approves the use of the following asymmetric algorithms for providing 
cryptographic solutions: 
 RSA with 2048 bits until 2029 




 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with curves P-224, K-233 or B-233 
until 2029 
 ECC with curves P-256, P-384, P-521, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-283, B-
409 and B-571 after 2030. 
RSA and ECC are the widely recommended algorithms for digital signing. 
Embedded SCADA devices/RTU has little computational power and only a small 
portion can be made available for protection and control. Some SCADA applications 
using protocols like GOOSE and SV have strict real-time constraints. 
Currently, IEC 62351 explicitly specifies the use of RSA as a solution to protect 
and authenticate time-critical messages. The following issues were found while 
implementing IEC 62351 in Substation Automation system. 
 Software implementation of RSA digital signature scheme did not meet the 
real-time requirements with today’s existing RTU’s/IED’s hardware. 
 RSA requires longer keys in order to be secured compared to other 
cryptosystems like ECC.  Though a longer key length in itself is not so much 
disadvantage, it contributes to slower encryption and decryption which 
makes it unsuitable for SCADA applications with real-time constraints. RSA 
theory says that for an n-bit key, computational effort for encryption is 
proportional to n
2
, while effort for decryption is proportional to n
3
. 
 The delay involved in implementing RSA digital signature schemes, leaves 
few devices and communication channel unsecured without adopting any 




This indicates that although RSA is highly recommended by IEC 62351, its low 
computational efficiency indeed affects the communication performance of time-
critical applications, which demands the need to consider an alternative new and 
faster asymmetric cryptosystem. ECC has attracted increased attention in SCADA 
networks over RSA, with few researchers in terms of required key lengths and 
processing times. Although ECC provides a better performance over RSA, it is 
necessary to consider approaches or techniques faster and secure than ECC for 
SCADA real-time applications. 
Our research is aimed at overcoming some of the limitations and shortcomings of 
the presently specified cryptographic security measures for SCADA real-time 
systems and improving their performance by proposing the application of faster and 
















INTRODUCTION TO NTRU CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM AND 
PROPOSED WORK 
This chapter provides a brief description of the NTRU encryption and signature 
algorithm, and the proposed work of using NTRU for SCADA security. 
Critical Infrastructure using SCADA system incorporates millions of electronic 
devices and users. To meet the cyber security requirements, every node/device in the 
SCADA system must have at least basic cryptographic functions, such as symmetric 
and asymmetric cryptographic primitives, to perform data encryption and 
authentication. This thesis is intended to provide a secure and faster cryptographic 
solution for SCADA system security using NTRU lattice based asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithm.  
5.1 Introduction to NTRU 
NTRU is a public key cryptosystem (PKCS) and an IEEE 1363.1 and X9.98 
standard [APPENDIX I]. It was first published in 1996 by J.Hoffstein, J.Pipher and 
Silverman. That same year, the developers of NTRU joined with D. Lieman and 
founded the NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc., and were given a patent on the 
cryptosystem.
 
In 2009, the company was acquired by Security Innovation, a software 
security company. It uses lattice based cryptography to encrypt and decrypt data. 
NTRU is based on algebraic structures of certain polynomial rings. The hard 
problem on which NTRU is based is the Short Vector Problem (finding a short 
vector in lattice). It consists of two algorithms: NTRUEncrypt, which is used for 




is proposed as a public-key encryption enabling high-speed processing. The NTRU 
encryption performs encryption and decryption by polynomial operations that can be 
implemented at higher speeds, as compared to RSA encryption that carries out 
modulo exponentiation under a certain rule and ECC that performs scalar 
multiplication for points on an elliptic curve. Another added advantage is 
unlike RSA and ECC, NTRU is not known to be vulnerable to quantum 
computer based attacks. 
5.2 NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem 
NTRU stands for n
th
 degree Truncated Ring polynomial Unit. NTRU is a relatively 
new Public Key Cryptosystem (PKCS) that uses lattice-based cryptography to 
encrypt and decrypt data. The algorithm is based on embedding messages in a 
polynomial ring, R. The ring R consists of truncated polynomials of degree N-1 
having integer coefficients that are reduced modulo certain parameters, after every 
math operation. The notation for the Ring is given as: 
R= Z[X] / (X
N-1
) 
Where Z represents the set of integers and N is 1 more than the degree of the 
polynomial. A full mathematical explanation is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
the reader is referred to the literature for an in-depth analysis of NTRU 
cryptography. 
A brief explanation of the algorithm is as follows: 
5.2.1 NTRU Parameters 








N The polynomials in the truncated polynomial ring have degree N-1 (Non-
secret) 
q Large modulus: The coefficients of the truncated polynomials will be 
reduced mod q. (Non-secret) 
p Small modulus: The coefficients of the message are reduced to mod p 
(Non secret) 
f A polynomial that is the private key (Secret) 
g A polynomial that is used  to generate the public key h from f (Secret but 
discarded after initial use) 
h A polynomial that is the public key 
r The random “blinding polynomial. (Secret but discarded after initial use) 
k A security parameter which controls resistance to certain types of attacks, 
including plaintext awareness. 
df The polynomial f has df coefficients equal to 1, (df-1) coefficients equal to 
-1, and the rest equal to 0. 
dg The polynomial g has dg coefficients equal to 1, dg coefficients equal to -1, 
and the rest equal to 0. 
dr The polynomial r has dr coefficients equal to 1, dr coefficients equal to -1, 
and the rest equal to 0. 
Table 5.1 NTRU Parameters and Keys 
 
5.2.2 Key Generation 
Bob wants to create a public/private key pair for the NTRU public key 
cryptosystem. 
 Bob chooses 2 random “small” polynomials f and g in the defined ring R A 
“small” polynomial is relative to a random polynomial mod q, i.e., the 




 Bob then computes the inverse of f modulo q and the inverse of f modulo p. 
The inverses are denoted as fq  and fp respectively. 
f*fq = 1 (modulo q) and f*fp = 1(modulo p) 
Bob should select f such that its inverses fq and fp exists. 
 Bob computes the product, h= pfq * g (modulo q). 
 Bob’s private key is the pair of polynomials f and fp. Bob’s public key is the 
polynomial h. 
5.2.3 Encryption 
Alice wants to send a message to Bob using Bob’s public key h. 
 Alice converts her message in the form of a polynomial m whose coefficients are 
chosen modulo p, between –p/2 and p/2 ( m is a small polynomial modulo q) 
 Alice randomly chooses a random polynomial r. This is the “blinding value”, 
which is used to obscure the message. 
 Alice computes the polynomial e = pr * h + m (modulo q). 
 The polynomial e is the encrypted message which Alice sends to Bob. 
5.2.4 Decryption 
Bob on receiving Alice’s encrypted message e, wants to decrypt it. 
 Bob uses his private polynomial f to compute a = f * e (modulo q). Since Bob is 
computing a modulo q, he chooses the coefficients of a to lie between –q/2 and 
q/2. 
 Bob next computes the polynomial b = a (modulo p) reducing each of the 
coefficients of a modulo p. 




 Polynomial c will be Alice’s original message m. 
5.2.5 Example 
Let N = 11, q = 32, p = 3, df  = 4, dg = 3. 
Bob needs to choose a polynomial f of degree 10 with four 1’s and three -1’s, and he 
needs to choose a polynomial g of degree 10 with three 1’s and three -1’s. Suppose 
he chooses: 
f = -1 + X + X
2
 – X4 + X6 + X9 – X10 






 – X8 – X10 
Next Bob computes the inverse fp of f modulo p and the inverse fq of f modulo q 
He finds that: 































The final step in key creation is to compute the product 



















 (modulo 32) 
Bob’s private key is the pair of polynomials f and fp and his public key is the 
polynomial h. 
For the purposes of this tutorial, let dr = 3. Now, suppose Alice wants to send the 
message, 
m = -1 + X
3
 – X4 – X8 + X9 + X10 
to Bob using Bob’s public key,  























She first chooses a random polynomial r of degree 10 with three 1’s and three -1’s. 
Say she chooses, 






 – X5 – X7 
Then her encrypted message e is, 



















 (modulo 32) 
Alice sends the encrypted message e to Bob. 
Upon decryption, he uses his private key f  to compute, 














 – 3X9 -7X10 (modulo 
32) 
Note that when Bob reduces the coefficients of f*e modulo 32, he chooses values 
lying between -15 and 16, not between 0 and 31. It is very important that he chooses 
the co-efficient in this way. Next Bob reduces the coefficients of a modulo 3 to get, 
b = a = -X –X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X7 –X8 –X10 (modulo 3) 
Finally Bob uses fp , the other part of his private key, to compute 
c = fp * b = -1 + X
3
 –X4 –X8 + X9 + X10 (modulo 3) 
The polynomial c is Alice’s message m, so Bob has successfully decrypted Alice’s 
message. 
5.2.6 Theoretical Operating Specifications 
This section gives an overview of the theoretical operating characteristics of the 
NTRU PKCS. There are four integer parameters (N, P, Q, and K) as described 
before. The following table 5.2 summarizes the NTRU PKCS characteristics in 




Plain Text Block (N-K) log2P bits 







Private Key Length 2Nlog2P bits 
Public Key Length Nlog2Q bits 
Table 5.2 NTRU PKCS operating characteristics 
 
5.3 NTRU Signature Scheme 
Digital signature schemes are a type of public-key encryption that is used for 
identifying a sender and preventing data falsification when data is sent from a 
receiving machine/client to a machine/client. The transmitting client creates 
signature data for data desired to be transmitted using a private key of the 
transmitting client, and then transmits the signature data to the receiving client 
together with the desired data. The receiving client performs a verification of the 
signature data using a public key corresponding to the private key of the transmitting 
apparatus to judge whether the desired data has been falsified .It is difficult to 
calculate a value of the private key from the public key.  
In the key generation under the NTRUSign signature scheme, the private key and 
the public key are generated by using multiple elements in a polynomial ring R with 
integer coefficients and an ideal of the ring R modulo polynomial X
N-1
. For 
generating a signature under the NTRUSign signature scheme for a message, the 
generated private key and 2N- dimensional vector, which is a hash value of the 




scheme, the public key, the signature of the message, and the 2N- dimensional 
vector are used. A full mathematical explanation is beyond the scope of this paper 
and the reader is referred to the literature [10] for an in-depth analysis of NTRU 
Signature scheme. 
5.4 Advantages of NTRU over other PKCS 
The benefits of using NTRU has been listed below which makes it a right choice for 
application in SCADA environment. 
 NTRU has been observed to be multiple times faster than RSA and ECC. 
 It consumes minimal resources including CPU and battery. 
 Significantly reduces server resource utilization for large-scale deployments. 
 Improves the data throughput(over RSA) when integrated with SSL 
 Ideal for low power or hard to access environments, for embedded devices 
where code size is a major limitation. 
 Resistant to Quantum computing attacks. 
5.5 Proposed Work 
This section provides a brief description about the issues with cryptographic 
solutions in SCADA with previous approaches to handle it and the proposed work. 
5.5.1 Issue & Previous Approaches 
Security standards for SCADA protocols such as IEC 62351 and AGA-12 explicitly 
specify the use of RSA & ECC based digital signature schemes for providing 
authentication, data-integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Due to the 
practical difficulties in implementing RSA digital signature scheme in limited 




alternative solution. HMAC [21] and HORS [22] are two such alternatives designed. 
However they have their own limitations. HMAC does not provide true data-origin 
authentication and HORS implementation requires a large public key size on the 
order of 10 KB, resulting in non-negligible overhead for both communication and 
storage. Although ECC based authentication mechanisms can provide better 
performance results when compared to RSA, in practical it is better to consider 
algorithms faster than ECC for real-time applications. Considering these issues, we 
propose the use of light-weighted and faster NTRU asymmetric cryptosystem [9 and 
10] into SCADA systems for use in encryption and digital signature. No previous 
research work suggests the use of NTRU as asymmetric algorithm in SCADA 
communication. 
5.5.2 Proposed Approach 
In our proposed approaches for encryption and authentication, NTRU is considered 
as the asymmetric cryptography. NTRU is chosen over RSA or ECC because it not 
only necessitates less power consumption and computation, but also reduced 
amounts of data transmitted and stored. Experiments conducted previously reveal 
that NTRU delivers substantial performance and size advantages over its 
competitors running multiple times faster while consuming minimal resources 
including CPU and battery [23 and 24]. Unlike RSA and ECC, NTRU is not known 
to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks. All these factors make it an 





The proposed Encryption and Authentication mechanisms in SCADA system 
include Certificate Creation I as its first phase where the key-generation operation 
and certificate issuance takes place. 
5.5.2.1 Key Generation and Certificate Creation 
To implement asymmetric/public-key cryptography in SCADA systems for 
providing a secure communication on an in-secure public network, it requires the 
use of digital certificates to verify the identity of the SCADA device/client machine. 
A public-key infrastructure (PKI) [25] is a system for the creation, storage, and 
distribution of digital certificates which are used to verify that a particular public key 
belongs to a certain entity. Every device/client machine in SCADA system that 
involves in transmitting messages has to create a NTRU private and public key pair 
using the NTRU key generation algorithm and stores it in the local key store. 
Administrators of these devices/machines direct a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) 
to the organization’s physically protected Certificate Authority (CA). CA which is a 
part of PKI system signs the CSR after analyzing the requester and then 
issues digital certificates that contain a public key and the identity of the owner. The 
public key is publicly made available to all parties with whom the requester 
communicates or it is exchanged during communication. This certificate is then used 
for encryption and authentication purposes. Figure 5.1 shows the steps involved in 





       
 




For SCADA applications involving real-time traffic, certificate exchange is not 
done as part of the messages; the digital certificates must be pre-installed on the 
receiving nodes. 
5.5.2.2 NTRU Encryption mechanism in SCADA communication 
The NTRU algorithm performs encryption and decryption by polynomial operations 
that can be implemented at higher speeds, as compared to RSA encryption that 
carries out modulo exponentiation under a certain rule and an elliptic curve 
cryptosystem that performs scalar multiplication for points on an elliptic curve. 
Hence, the NTRU encryption in SCADA achieves higher-speed processing than 
conventional public-key encryption, and is also capable of performing, when used in 
software processing, the processing in a practical period of time.  
In order to ensure data-integrity, SCADA messages have to be encrypted when 
they are transmitted. In this proposed mechanism, the messages are encoded into a 




message/control signals to another device/client “B”, “A” uses the public key of “B” 
published by the Certificate Authority to encrypt the encoded message to create a 
cipher message. On the receiving end, “B” decrypts the cipher message using its 
own private key to obtain the original message. Figure 5.2 shows how encryption 
and decryption of SCADA message is done using NTRU asymmetric keys. 
 
        
 
Figure 5.2 Encrypting and decrypting SCADA messages with NTRU Keys 
 
For SCADA communication involving lengthy message transmission, the NTRU 
asymmetric encryption can be used to distribute the secret symmetric session keys 
with which the actual message encryption takes place. A detailed explanation of it 






Figure 5.3 NTRU used in distributing secret symmetric key 
 
For each new session, a new session key will be established. This is mainly 
adopted for bulk message transmission because symmetric key encryption is much 
faster than asymmetric key encryption. The secret key used can be generated using 
any symmetric algorithm approved by IEC 62351 such as AES, DES etc. 
5.5.2.3 NTRU Based Authentication in SCADA communication 
In this approach NTRU Digital Signature scheme is chosen in SCADA systems for 
ensuring authenticity. The message to be transmitted is encoded into a polynomial 
ring R. To verify the integrity of the data that is transmitted, the data is subjected to 
non-keyed hash algorithm such as SHA-1, SHA-256 etc. The message digest 
obtained by this process is signed using the sender’s NTRU private key. The 
encrypted message digest is sent to the receiver along with the encoded message that 
is encrypted using the receiver’s NTRU public key. Thus the sender sends 1) 




The receiver upon receiving them decrypts the message using its own NTRU 
private key and computes the message digest using the same hash algorithm. It then 
verifies the digital signature using the publicized NTRU public key of the sender and 
the computed message digest. In our proposed approach, NTRU digital signature 
algorithm is used rather than the slow RSA which makes it convenient for use in 
SCADA applications involving real-time constraints as seen in Fig 5.4. 
 





Previously, the security of real-time traffic was limited to message authentication 
with no encryption specified. However since implementing NTRU digital signature 
takes less time compared to its RSA counterpart, encryption can also be specified for 
such applications with real-time constraints ensuring data-integrity of the message as 
well. We can even consider a hybrid approach that uses NTRU for digital signature 
























EXPERIMENTATION AND TEST RESULTS 
This chapter focuses on the experimental case study conducted on Raspberry Pi and 
Intel Core machine for the comparison of NTRU asymmetric cryptosystem with 
others used in SCADA system such as RSA and ECC. The first section of this 
chapter gives an introduction to Raspberry Pi and the second section gives a detailed 
description of the experimentation conducted and the test results observed. 
6.1 Introduction to Raspberry Pi 
The tests for comparing the performance of NTRU, RSA and ECC with respect to 
their encryption, decryption and digital signature speeds were conducted on 
Raspberry Pi. Raspberry Pi is a credit-card sized single board computer developed in 
UK. It has a Broadcom BCM2835 system on a chip which includes ARMv6k 700 
MHz processor. Figure 6.1 shows the Raspberry Pi kit used for experimentation. 
 
                          




There are two models of Raspberry Pi available mainly based on the size of 
memory. Model B with 512 MB SDRAM @ 400 MHz was chosen for our 
experimentation purpose. The Raspberry Pi was chosen to run on Debian Linux 
operating system. It also supports other OS such as RISC OS, FreeBSD, NetBSD 
and Plan 9. It does not include a built-in hard disk or solid-state drive, but uses an 
SD card for booting and long-term storage. 
6.2 Experimentation 
To motivate our research, the performance characteristics of NTRU, RSA and ECC 
are observed by implementing the algorithms for computation using the open source 
Bouncy Castle 1.47 Java library and comparing their experimental run times. Open 
JDK-7 with Cacao Virtual Machine was used for faster execution. Our experiments 
were conducted on 700 MHz Raspberry Pi running Linux and Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 
CPU @ 2.27GHz to facilitate performance comparison.  
For the first experiment, the run times for three fundamental primitives of a 
cryptosystem: encryption, decryption and key generation was chosen as comparison 
parameters for the two algorithms (NTRU and RSA) for different key-sizes. The test 
was done for randomly generated message of size 32 bytes. Table 6.2 and 6.3 shows 
the comparison of computation times of encryption algorithms between Intel 
machine and Raspberry Pi. The result shows that RSA leads to a bad performance 
while generating asymmetric keys, and worst when the CPU speed is as low as 700 
MHz. Also at equivalent cryptographic strength, NTRU performs costly private key 
operations much faster than RSA. As key sizes increase, RSA's operations per 




quadratically (RSA-2048 can be compared to NTRU-439, RSA-3072 can be 
compared to NTRU-743). RSA Decryption is expensive because it involves modular 
exponentiation of huge numbers. Though there wasn’t any huge difference in the 
encryption speed between NTRU and RSA in Intel core machine, NTRU encryption 
was 2-3x faster than RSA encryption. The tabular results show that NTRU would be 
a better choice for encryption in SCADA systems were key management of 










RSA-1024 21.27 0.45 1.25 
RSA-2048 90.51 0.52 3.03 
RSA-3072 233.68 0.59 9.48 
NTRU-439 6.27 0.28 0.22 
NTRU-743 9.94 0.32 0.25 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption speed on 













RSA-1024 3701.53 9.23 160.55 
RSA-2048 24714.24 72.80 1123.98 
RSA-3072 69522.21 172.23 3618.86 
NTRU-439 1173.29 15.98 20.59 
NTRU-743 2970.41 160.35 46.12 
 
Table 6.2 Comparison of Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption speed on 





Secondly, the performance of RSA, ECC and NTRU digital signature schemes 
were compared using Java. After performing several tests, the average time taken for 
signing and verification for various algorithms can be seen in Table 6.4. Clearly the 
total time taken by NTRU signature scheme is apparently very less when compared 
to RSA and ECC making it an appropriate choice for providing authentication in 





















RSA-2048 40.47 1324 1.64 48.81 42 1372 
RSA-3072 63.37 3962.9 1.97 85.34 65 4048 
ECDSA-256 9.41 437.3 4.48 336.7 13 773 
ECDSA-512 21.55 926.5 6.30 468.8 27 1394 
NTRU-439 5.16 402.6 4.18 206.4 9 608 
NTRU-739 6.23 532.4 5.74 396.2 12 928 
   
Table 6.3 Comparison of Signing and Verification speed on  
Intel Core @ 2.27GHz and on Raspberry Pi @ 700 MHz 
 
6.3 Test Results 
The following results were observed based on the experimentation conducted. 
Figure 6.2 shows the performance of RSA and NTRU key generation operation on 
Raspberry Pi. The time taken for generating the private and public key for each 
algorithm with different key sizes is represented as a bar graph. Results indicate that 
RSA key generation is 20 to 25 times slower than the corresponding NTRU key 





                   
Figure 6.2 Performance Comparison of RSA and NTRU Key Generation 
 
Based on the encryption and decryption runtimes of NTRU and RSA on Raspberry 
Pi, Figure 6.3 shows the graphical comparison of their total runtime for different key 
sizes of NTRU and RSA. Observed results show that total time taken for encryption 








The experimental evaluation of digital signature schemes of all three algorithm 




performed per second of each algorithm based on the Intel core results. Clearly 
NTRU based digital signature scheme takes less time when compared to its 
counterparts for the same level of security. 
 
                   



















CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK 
In previous sections we summarized the need for securing SCADA communication 
and about the practical difficulties in implementing the currently used cryptographic 
standards (such as RSA) in applications involving real-time constraints and devices 
with hardware limitations. Thus it becomes necessary and useful to devise an 
alternative asymmetric cryptography solution to enable end-to-end security in all 
SCADA systems/devices irrespective of any constraints. 
In this research, a new alternative solution for the above said issue was proposed 
by employing NTRU-based encryption and authentication schemes in SCADA that 
addresses the Data-Integrity, Confidentiality, Authentication and Non-repudiation 
issues. The performance evaluation of different asymmetric algorithm such as RSA, 
NTRU and ECC was done in Java. Their encryption, decryption and key-generation 
speeds were compared. The results show that cryptographic operations of NTRU are 
indeed faster than RSA & ECC for the same level of security (around 2 to 10 times 
faster). The time taken for RSA and NTRU digital signature algorithm was 
compared along with the time for encrypting and decrypting data using the hybrid 
solution. While a more optimized version of NTRU in C would yield faster times 
when compared to its counterparts’ optimized version. Since NTRU is not based on 
any factorization or discrete logarithmic problems allowing it to achieve high speeds 
with the use of minimal computing power. This shows that usage of a light-weight 
asymmetric key protocol like NTRU is necessary for supporting a secure and faster 




To further motivate our research, in the future we intend to integrate and compare 
the performances of these cryptographic operations in real-time SCADA protocols 
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